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USING GOVERNMENT-OBTAINED JUDGMENTS TO PROVE
THE CONSPIRATORIAL NATURE OF SUBSEQUENT
REFUSALS TO DEAL: THE JOKER IN
PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION
A WIDE divergence appears in recent cases as to whether section 5 of the
Clayton Act 1 permits plaintiffs in private antitrust suits to substantiate claims
of a present conspiracy by offering Government-obtained judgments that de-
fendants had conspired at an earlier date. To ensure the effectiveness of the
antitrust laws, section 4 of the Clayton Act supplements Justice Department
enforcement by granting a cause of action to injured private parties.2 The
Government is authorized to bring a criminal action to punish antitrust viola-
tions,3 an equity proceeding to restrain such violations, 4 or a civil suit to re-
cover actual damages incurred in its role as a purchaser,5 while private parties
1. (a) A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust
laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evi-
dence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 15a
of this title, as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an
estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply
to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to
judgments and decrees entered in actions under section 1Sa of this title.
Clayton Act § 5, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958). Section 5 further
provides that the running of the statute of limitations in respect of a private right of action
shall be suspended during the pendency of government litigation and for one year there-
after.
2. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). A private cause of action was first
provided for in Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), which was superseded by
§ 4 and repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283. See ScHWARTZ, FRaE
ENTERPRISE AND ECONOmiC ORGANIZATION 18 n.24 (2d ed. 1959).
3. Sherman Act §§ 1-3, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1958). The
penalty is a fine of $50,000 and/or imprisonment for a period not to exceed one year. The
liability of directors, officers or agents of a corporation which violates a penal provision
of the antitrust laws is limited to a fine of $5,000 and/or imprisonment for a period not
to exceed one year. Clayton Act § 14, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1958).
4. See Sherman Act § 4, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958) ; Clay-
ton Act § 15, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958).
The Government may bring a criminal action and an injunction proceeding either
simultaneously or successively, at the discretion of the Department of Justice. See Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912).
5. 'Clayton Act § 4A, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1958) ; see Forkosch, Sug-
gested Limitation Upon the 1955 Amendment Permitting the United States To Sue for
Treble Damages-An Analysis, 1 ANTITRUST BULL 289 (1955). Prior to the 1955 amend-
ment, the United States was not considered a person within the meaning of § 4 and thus
could not recover for damages to its business or property. United States v. Cooper Corp.,
312 U.S. 600 (1941). Congress felt that the remedies of indictment and injunction were
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can sue for treble their damages 1 or for an injunction.7 Although all antitrust
litigation is difficult and time-consuming 8 a private plaintiff is especially dis-
advantaged; more often than the Government, he lacks the funds and facilities
requisite to success.9 And his problems multiply in cases of alleged conspira-
torial refusals to deal, since he must establish, usually without direct proof,
that the refusal was the product of conspiracy rather than independent business
decisions.Y0 Of course, his evidentiary burden would be lessened if conspiracy
had already been proved in a government suit and if he could use the Govern-
ment's judgment as evidence in his treble-damage action.
If common law rules of estoppel and admissibility applied to his cause of
action, however, plaintiff would derive no evidentiary benefit from a govern-
inadequate to protect the proprietary interests of the Government. See H.R. RP. No. 2467,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
6. Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731. (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). This provision seeks
to induce private persons to uncover violations of the antitrust laws. "It is a way of secur-
ing a private policeman to enforce the public law." Hearings Belore the Subcommittee
on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Conzmittee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., ser. 14, pt. 5, at 56, 57 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] ; accord, Karseal Corp.
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Standard
Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). On the efficacy of this
remedy, compare Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in
Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MicH. L. REv. 363 (1954) ("The great complexity and expense
of antitrust cases seems to prevent any pioneering in the field by private plaintiffs, the
proof of which is that the landmark cases in recent times have not been treble damage
suits."), and Bicks, The Department of Justice and Priate Treble Damage Actions, 4
ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 6-9 (1959), with Comment, 18 U. CHi. L. REv. 130, 138 (1950) ("..
without the treble damage sanction, the meagre nature of the criminal penalties arising
from governmental actions would render the antitrust laws nugatory.").
7. Clayton Act § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958). Prior to the Clayton
Act, a private person could not sue to restrain or prevent a violation of the Sherman Act.
Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459 (1917). A private injunction decree does not
preclude the United States from seeking the same equitable relief. United States v. Borden
Co., 347 U.S. 514, 519 (1954). It is also possible for a private party to use the antitrust
laws as a defensive weapon. See, e.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258
U.S. 346 (1922).
8. See Hearings 3 (testimony of Milton Handler) ; McAllister, The Big Case: Pro-
cedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. Rnv. 27 (1950).
9. The cost to the government of a single litigation may exceed $100,000. Manifestly
the private litigant is rarely in a position to make such vast investments in the un-
certainties of a lawsuit, .particularly if he has been driven out of business or if his
business has been seriously weakened as a result of the violation.
Hearings 3 (testimony of Milton Handler).
10. The individual businessman may exercise unrestricted freedom to deal for good and
sufficient reason, or for no reason whatsoever. See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300 (1919). But this right is not absolute. See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1922). The claim to protection may be lost when the design of
the individual is to establish a wrongful monopoly. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951). It may also be lost if the refusal is the product of concerted
action. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). See gen-
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ment judgment. 1 The Government's judgment would not have conclusive effect
by estopping defendants from relitigating the issues determined in that suit;
judicial estoppel applies only when the parties to both suits are identical.1
Moreover, as a general rule, a judgment is not admissible to prove the facts
on which it was based.' 3 In order to effectuate section 4, therefore,"4 Congress
enacted section 5, which authorizes private plaintiffs to use government judg-
ments as prima facie evidence of "all matters respecting which ... [the] judg-
ment would be an estoppel as between the" defendants and the Government."0
erally Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1,
79-116 (1959) ; Note, 68 YALE L.J. 949 (1959).
The overriding problem of proof in these cases is not to establish the unanimity of ac-
tion, but to demonstrate that the similarity is conspiratorial. Parallel behavior is admissible
circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948). But this evidence is not conclusive:
The crucial question is whether respondents' conduct toward petitioner stemmed
from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express. To be sure, busi-
ness behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may
infer agreement .... But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business
behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such be-
havior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of con-
sciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial
attitude toward conspiracy, but "conscious parallelism" has not yet read conspiracy
out of the Sherman Act entirely.
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954).
See generally Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950);
Sorkin, Conscio s Parallelism, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 281 (1957).
11. Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63
(1918); cf. Chantangco v. Abaroa, 218 U.S. 476, 481 (1910) (dictum).
12. Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1932) ; Ramsey v.
United States, 61 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1932) ; see 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 654 (5th ed.
1925) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). But see Developments in the Law"--Res
Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 861-65 (1952) (emphasis on identity diminishing).
The identity of the parties is the crucial element, rather than a possible distinction be-
tween a criminal suit and a civil suit. A prior criminal conviction will work an estoppel in
a subsequent civil proceeding between the same parties. Local 167, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886);
United States v. Greater N.Y. Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 53 F.2d 518 (S.D.N.Y.
1931). An acquittal, on the other hand, does not work an estoppel. United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 493 (1950) ; Stone v. United States, 167
U.S. 178 (1897).
13. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1671a (3d ed. 1940) (three possible grounds: judgment
not based on personal observation, opposite rule might induce a scant proferring of evidence
in second trial, different issues in each case) ; Hinton, Judgment of Conviction--Effect in
a Civil Case as Res Judicata or as Evidence, 27 ILL. L. REv. 195, 197-98 (1932). Contra,
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 521 (1942) ; UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(20).
14. Wilson, Address to Joint Session of Congress, January 20, 1914, 51 CONu. REc.
1964 (1914) (recommendation of President Wilson) ; see 51 id. at 9270, 9488-94, 13851-56,
13853-56, 15938-40, 16319.
15. See note 1 supra. For § 5 purposes, the government judgment must be final, Fifth
& Walnut, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 176 F.2d 587, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 894
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In the conventional refusal to deal case in which plaintiff seeks to invoke sec-
tion 5, he would first allege that the refusal is another contemporaneous mani-
festation of the same general conspiracy proved in the Government's action.
Then, after introducing the judgment, the plaintiff would have to establish
only that he was in fact injured by the general conspiracy and the extent of that
injury.16 But recently plaintiffs have contended that section 5 benefits extend
beyond this setting to cases where the refusal to deal occurred subsequent to
the time period involved in the government litigation.
This problem was raised, but not resolved, in the 1954 case of Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramenunt Film Distrib. Corp.17 There, plaintiff alleged
that between 1949 and 1950 its business-a large theater in the suburbs of
Baltimore-had been impaired by film distributors' conspiratorial refusal to
license first-run motion pictures to it on an equal basis with its counterparts
downtown. To prove its claim of conspiracy, plaintiff attempted to introduce
the judgments in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,18 where similar
practices by the same defendants prior to 1945 had been condemned as con-
spiratorial. The district court admitted the judgments, apparently as prima
facie evidence of a pre-1945 violation which would "support" plaintiff's charge,
but instructed the jury that plaintiff would have to introduce additional evi-
dence to show a 1949-1950 conspiracy in Baltimore.10 The jury found for de-
fendants, and the case was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.20 In the Supreme
Court, plaintiff contended that the trial judge should have instructed the jury
that the prior judgments were direct prima facie evidence of the conspiratorial
nature of the 1949-1950 refusal to deal.21 The defendants, on the other hand,
(1949), and the private claim must be asserted under the antitrust laws, Volk v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mim. 1950). A Federal Trade Commission action is
not one brought by or on behalf of the United States for these purposes. Proper v. John
Bene & Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
By its terms, § 5 is applicable to all violations of the antitrust laws and has been used
outside the refusal-to-deal area. See Comment, 61 YALEu L.J. 1010, 1039-43 (1952). Recent
studies indicate that § 5 is a significant weapon of the private antitrust plaintiff. Approxi-
mately 77% of private actions follow government litigation. Bicks, The Department of
Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 AxrnmnusT Buu.. 5, 7 (1959).
16. See, e.g., Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors, 340 U.S. 558 (1951), Note, 65
HARv. L. REv. 1400 (1952), 39 IL-. B.J. 604 (1951), Note, 61 YALE L.J. 417 (1952).
17. 346 U.S. 537 (1954). The major issue in this case was whether conscious parallel-
ism was legally tantamount to a Sherman Act violation. See note 10 supra; 40 A.B.A.J.
229 (1954) ; The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 HARv. L. REv. 138 (1954) ; 52 .Mic". L
Rxv. 1076 (1954) ; 28 ST. Jonx's L. Rxv. 286 (1954).
18. 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y.), 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd in part and
re''d in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), opinion on remand, 85 F. Supp. E81 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
19. See 346 U.S. at 542-43.
20. 201 F2d 306 (4th Cir. 1953).
21. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 53-54:
The mere fact that the findings in the Paramount case showed the situation generally
as of 1945, whereas petitioner made its first request for first-run product in January
1948, in no way deprives petitioner of the right to rely upon the decrees eveatuall
entered in that case as prima facie evidence of conspiracy here.
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maintained that the existence of an earlier conspiracy was irrelevant in deter-
mining whether defendants conspired during 1949-1950 and, therefore, that the
judgments were inadmissible for any purpose.22 The Court held that plaintiff
had not been aggrieved by the trial court's instructions because, at best, the
relevancy of the Paramount judgments was "slight." And, since the defendants
carried the day, the Court found no need to pass on their contention.
23
While Theatre Enterprises alerted potential private plaintiffs to the possi-
bility of introducing government judgments in the "subsequent conspiracy"
situation, it provided no guidance to lower courts, which, since 1954, have been
faced with the necessity of determining the applicability of section 5 in this
context.2 4 Some, relying on Theatre Enterprises, have accepted government
judgments as prima facie evidence of the prior conspiracy, without indicating
what relevance proof of prior conspiracy would have in the subsequent action,26
or as "background material," without explaining the function of such evi-
dence.26 One court, on the other hand, relied solely on Theatre Enterprises to
exclude a prior judgment.27 And in several cases the prior judgments have
been excluded on grounds of irrelevancy.28 Perhaps this confusion in the cases
results from a failure explicitly to distinguish estoppel, the statutory test, from
22. 346 U.S. at 544.
23. Ibid.
24. See Webster Rosewood Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 263 F.2d 533 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1.959) (prior judgment in 1942; claimed damage period
1942-1950; admitted) ; Park Neponset Corp. v. Smith, 258 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1958) (prior
judgment Paramount case; plaintiff commenced operations in 1947; not admitted) ; Eagle
Lion Studios v. Loew's, Inc., 248 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 100
(1959) (Paramount judgment; claimed damage period 1946-1952; not admitted); Para-
mount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Village Theatre, 228 F.2d 721 (loth Cir. 1956) (Paramount
judgment; claimed damage period 1949-1952; not admitted) ; Basle Theatres, Inc. v. War-
ner Bros. Picture Distrib. Corp., 168 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Pa. 1959) (Paramount judg-
ment; plaintiff commenced operations in 1950; admitted) ; Orbo Theatre Corp. v. Loew's,
Inc., 156 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 943 (1959) (Paranwunt judgment; plaintiff commenced operations in 1955; ad-
mitted) ; Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 209 F.2d 41. (5th Cir. 1954)
(Paramount judgment; admitted); Alamo Theatre Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 419
(N.D. Ill. 1956) (Paramount judgment; plaintiff commenced operations in 1947; motion
to strike not granted) ; Robbinsdale Amusement Corp. v. Warner Bros. Picture Distrib.
Corp., 141 F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1955), appeal disnissed, 235 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1956)
(Paramount judgment; plaintiff commenced operations in 1951; not admitted).
Two earlier cases involved allegations of a subsequent conspiracy. Shotkin v. General
Elec. Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948) (.prior judgment had "no bearing whatever") ;
Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 15 F:R.D. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1953), aff'd, 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 (1955) (plaintiff complained of a "lingering effect"; court held
that § 5 was not available).
25. Basle Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Picture Distrib. Corp., supra note 24; Orbo
Theatre Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., stJra note 24.
26. Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 800, 804 (D. Del. 1948).
27. Park Neponset Corp. v. Smith, 258 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1958).
28. E.g., Robbinsdale Amusement Corp. v. Warner Bros. Picture Distrib. Corp., 141
F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1955), appeal dismissed, 235 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1956).
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relevancy, the evidentiary test of admissibility. By its terms, the statute pro-
vides only that a government judgment shall be prima facie evidence in a later
private action if estoppel between the Government and the defendants would
exist. But, for a private plaintiff to derive evidentiary benefit from a govern-
ment judgment, he must show relevancy as well as estoppel; evidence of any
kind is inadmissible unless it is relevant.29 If a prior judgment would fail to
meet section 5's estoppel test in subsequent conspiracy cases, however, a rele-
vancy question would never be reached. And relevancy could be assumed if
section 5 made a prior judgment prima facie evidence of the subsequent con-
spiracy since the proffered judgment would go directly to the issue in contro-
versy.30 But if the judgment is prima facie evidence only of a prior conspiracy,
plaintiff would have to demonstrate that evidence of a prior conspiracy is rele-
vant in the second action.
A prior judgment would not be prima facie evidence of a subsequent con-
spiracy under section 5, which encompasses only those judgments that would
be conclusive under the judicial doctrine of collateral estoppel-the referrant
of section 5's "estoppel" 3 1-- in a subsequent government suit.32 Collateral estop-
29. See 1 WIGmoae, EvomrcE §§ 9-10 (3d ed. 1940); UNIFoRn! Ruras oF EVIaEcE
1(2) ("'relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any
material fact"); James, Relevancy, Probability and the Lazu, 29 CALIF. L RE,. 689, 691
(1941). Evidence which has probative value is logically relevant, but not all logically rele-
vant evidence is admissible. Certain rules of "auxiliary probative policy" exist which assume
that evidence is logically relevant but-apply extra safeguards designed to treat special situa-
tions. See 4 ViGmORE, EvmENcE § 1171 (3d ed. 1940) (discussing various examples of this
policy). Thus, to determine whether logically relevant evidence should be heard, a court
must engage in a weighing process. Professor McCormick points out four factors which
must be counter-balanced against the probative worth of the evidence:
First, the danger that the facts offered may unduly arouse the jury's emotions of
prejudice, hostility or sympathy. Second, the probability that the proof and the an-
swering evidence that it provokes may create a side-issue that will unduly distract
the jury from the main issues. Third, the likelihood that the evidence offered and the
counter-proof will consume an undue amount of time. Fourth, the danger of unfair
surprise to the opponent when, having no reasonable ground to anticipate this de-
velopment of the proof, he would be unprepared to meet it.
McCoamcE:, EVmENCE 319-20 (1954).
Dean ,Vigmore uses the term "legal relevancy" to indicate the result of this balancing
process. 1 WmoRE, EVIDExCE § 28 (3d ed. 1940) ; cf. Hoag v. Wright, 34 App. Div. 260,
54 N.Y. Supp. 658, 662 (1898). But McCormick would discard the use of the term "legal"
as it might tend to "emphasize a conformity to precedent in an area where the need for
discretionary responsibility for weighing of value against danger in the particular use
should be stressed." McCoaamcx, EVIDMNCE 321 (1954). Hereinafter, the term "relevancy"
will be used in the sense suggested by McCormick as the result of the balancing process.
30. Only when circumstantial evidence is offered must the court indulge in the process
of balancing which is implicit in the concept of relevancy. When the evidence offered goes
directly to the issue in controversy the only question for the jury is truthfulness. See Mc-
CosiuCx, EVIDmENCE 316 (1954).
31. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
3Z See ibid.; Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, Inc., 210 F.2d 86, 90 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954).
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pel prevents relitigation of issues raised and directly determined in a prior
action between the same parties.83 The doctrine's rationale would not apply in
the subsequent conspiracy context; the existence of a subsequent conspiracy
could not possibly have been put in issue or determined during the prior litiga-
tion.3 4 Thus, section 5's requirements are not met.
Further, even use of the prior judgment only to prove a prior judgment
might not meet the statutory test in a subsequent conspiracy case. The opera-
tion of collateral estoppel is sharply limited by the doctrine enunciated in The
Evergreens v. Nunan,3 5 which is based on ,a distinction between "ultimate
facts" and "mediate facts." An ultimate fact is a datum, directly in controversy,
which is an essential element of plaintiff's claim.8 0 For example, the existence
of an alleged conspiratorial refusal to deal is an ultimate fact in a private anti-
trust action.37 A mediate fact, on the other hand, is one from which the exist-
ence of an ultimate fact can only be inferred.38 The Evergreens rule makes
collateral estoppel inapplicable to facts which are mediate in the second action.8 9
33. E.g., Tait v. Western Md. R.R., 289 U.S. 620 (1933) ; United Shoe Mach. Corp.
v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 458-59 (1922) ; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351
(1876).
34. See Third Nat'l Bank v. Stone, 174 U.S. 432, 434 (1899) ("A question cannot be
held to have been adjudged before an issue on that subject could possible have arisen") ;
cf. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955) ("While the 1943
judgment precludes recovery on claims arising prior to its entry, it cannot be given the
effect of extinguishing claims which did not even then exist and which could not possibly
have been sued upon in the previous case") ; Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-O-Lite
Co., 264 Fed. 810, 816 (6th Cir. 1920). See generally Note, 64 YALE L.J. 436 (1955).
35. 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944) (L. Hand, J.).
36. See Mumm v. Decker & Sons, 301 U.S. 168 (1937); The Evergreens v. Nunan,
supra note 35, at 928; United States v. Smith, 39 F.2d 851, 854 (lst Cir. 1930) ; McCullough
Egg Equip. Co. v. Poultry Producers, 50 F.2d 945, 946 (N.D. Calif. 1931); United States
v. Charpentier, 49 F.2d 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1931) ; Maxwell Steel Vault Co. v. National Casket
Co., 205 Fed. 515, 524 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
Some courts, however, label "ultimate" those facts which cannot be directly established,
and which must be deduced by inference. NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F.2d 528,
532 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Commissioner v. Sharp, 91 F.2d 804, 805 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Ocean Ace.
& Guar. Corp. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 75 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir. 1935). According to
this view, a fact could be "ultimate" and yet not be essential to plaintiff's cause of action.
37. The other ultimate facts in a private action are impact and damages. See Emich
Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951). But see Zuckerman v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 70316 (S.D.N.Y.) ("The ultimate fact is the
impact; an evidentiary fact in [sic] the illegality").
38. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720
(1944). Some courts would brand any fact which itself can be directly established by evi-
dence "mediate," regardless of whether it is essential to plaintiff's cause of action. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Sharp, 91 F.2d 804, 805 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Real Estate Title Ins. & Trust
Co. v. Ledered, 229 Fed. 799, 805 (E.D. Pa. 1916). The term "mediate" is interchangeable
with the term "evidentiary."
39. The Evergreens v. Nunan, supra note 38, at 930-31.:
[Elven assuming arguendo that "mediate data," decided in the first suit, conclu-
sively establish facts "ultimate" in the second, no fact decided in the first whether
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Since a prior conspiracy proved by a government judgment is not an essential
element of a subsequent conspiracy, the judgment can only be a mediate fact.
Thus, if Evergreens were embodied in the statute it would entirely eliminate
the use of prior judgments as prima facie evidence in treble-damage actions
alleging subsequent conspiracies.
If Congress intended section 5 estoppel to shift as the doctrine of collateral
estoppel developed, 40 Evergreens would be part of the statutory test; today it
is the "normal" rule.4 1 If, however, "estoppel" were frozen in its 1914 form,
whether pre-Clayton-Act courts would have applied collateral estoppel to facts
mediate in the second action is unclear.42 In any event, the rationale of Ever-
greens-limitation of collateral estoppel so that defendants can assess the total
extent of their potential liability and on that basis determine the conduct of
"ultimate" or a "mediate datum" conclusively establishes any "mediate datum" in
the second, or anything except a fact "ultimate' in that suit.
Accord, Nelson v. Swing-A-Way Mfg. Co., 266 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1959); Grandview
Dairy, Inc. v. Jones, 157 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946) ; United
States v. Five Cases, 156 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1946) ; REsT.xTWmFNT, JUDGmENTs § 68, com-
ment p (Supp. 1948).
40. Collateral estoppel "is growing law and has been the subject of very considerable
development in the last decade by the supreme court of the United States.' Singer v. A.
Hollander & Son, 202 F.2d 55, 57 (3d Cir. 1953). See generally Developie, ts it the Lau,
-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818 (1952).
41. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 338 (1957) ; see Bordonaro Bros. Theaters,
Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 203 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1953) (dictum). But one district
court has held that Evergreens was not embodied in the statute. Zuckerman x% E. L du Pont
de Nemours & Co., Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 70316 (S.D.N.Y.). This court held Evergreens
inapplicable on two grounds. First, the court reasoned that the prior judgment as used by
virtue of § 5 was only prima fade, rather than conclusive, evidence. Apparently it felt that
since the defendant has complete freedom of rebutting the prima fade evidence at the trial
he is not estopped from making any defense and there is no question of depriving him of
his day in court. Admittedly, courts have stricken from a complaint an allegation that a
prior judgment was conclusive. De Luxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban & Katz Corp., 95 F.
Supp. 983, 986 (N.D. Ill. 1951). Realistically, however, such evidence has an effect much
greater than the term prima fade suggests. Hearings 52 (testimony of Jerrold Van Cise:
"whether you call it prima facie or conclusive, it is going to be considered conclusive by
the jury"); Hearings on HR. 3408 Before the Subcomnittee op Study of 3onopoly
Power of the House Commttee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1951) (testimony
of Kenneth Royall). The original House bill provided that a prior judgment should be con-
clusive, rather than prima fade, evidence. H.R. RF'. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1914).
Serious doubts were raised as to the constitutionality of such a provision, and the bill was
amended to its present form. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 58 (1914).
Second, the Zuckerman court reasoned that Evergreens was inapplicable because Coni-
gress generally intended to benefit antitrust plaintiffs, but cited no legislative history on
the specific point.
42. Judge Hand assumed that he was deciding the point for the first time, 141 F2d at
930, but dicta to the same effect appear in earlier cases. See United States v. .oser, 266
U.S. 236, 241 (1924); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 459
(1922) ; New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U.S. 371, 396 (1897) ; Hoffman v. Hoffman,
330 Ill. 413, 418, 161 N.E. 723, 726 (1928).
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their defense 43 -seems as applicable in an antitrust setting as in any other.
Predicting possible liability is particularly difficult in the subsequent conspiracy
context, since the putative plaintiff's cause of action had not arisen at the time
of the original government suit.44
Should Evergreens prove inapplicable, and prior government judgments qual-
ify under section 5 as prima facie evidence of a prior conspiracy, a plaintiff
would still have to demonstrate such a judgment's relevancy to his claim of a
present conspiratorial refusal to deal. Plaintiffs may urge that the judgment is
relevant because it indicates a "proclivity" of the defendants to unlawful con-
duct.45 The various courts which have faced the problem of proclivity evidence
in antitrust cases have reached varying results, without thorough consideration
of the applicable rules of evidence.4" Under a widely accepted rule, evidence
that a defendant had previously committed illegal acts is not admissible to show
that the individual has a propensity for similar wrongs. 47 Indeed, it has been
said that such evidence often lacks logical relevancy in the context of civil
litigation.48 Admittedly, proof of past wrongdoing may have some probative
value, but the test of relevancy requires the court to balance the probative value
43. "Logical relevance is of infinite possibility; there is no conceivable limit which can
be put to it. Defeat in one suit might entail results beyond all calculation by either party;
a trivial controversy might bring utter disaster in its train." 141 F.2d at 929; see Note, 52
COLUm. L. REv. 647, 663 (1.952) ; Developtnents in the La--Res Judicata, 65 HAIV. L.
REv. 818, 843 (1952) ; Note, 57 HARv. L. R v. 921, 922 (1944).
44. The risk faced by the defendant would depend on his exposure and vulnerability
to treble-damage litigation, see Seeley, The Pitfalls Which Lurk in Govcrnnent Litigation
for Defendants Who May Be Subjected to Treble Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL.
17, 21 (1959), and could be prevented only if, in a civil case, he accepted the entry of a
consent decree, see text of § 5 in note 1 supra, or, in a criminal case, pleaded guilty or
nolo contendere, see Twin Parts Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939).
45. See Robbinsdale Amusement Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 141
F. Supp. 134, 143 (D. Minn. 1955), appeal dismissed, 235 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1956).
46. Compare United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 147 (1948)
Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 169 F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1948), and Milgram v. Loew's,
Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951.), with Monticello Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
197 F.2d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Robbinsdale Amusement Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures
Distrib. Corp., supra note 45, at 143, and Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., supra at 584 (dissent-
ing opinion).
47. This rule is codified in MODFL CODE OF EVID NCE rule 311 (1942):
Subject to Rule 306 [Evidence concerning a person's character as tending to prove
his conduct], evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified
occasion is inadmissible as tending to prove that he committed a crime or civil wrong
on another occasion if, but only if, the evidence is relevant solely as tending to prove
his disposition to commit such a crime or civil wrong or to commit crimes or civil
wrongs generally.
See generally Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HIAv.
L. REv. 954 (1933) ; Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America,
51 HARv. L. REv. 988 (1938).
48. 1 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 64 (3d ed. 1.940).
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of such evidence against the danger that the facts offered would be prejudicial. 0
Since evidence of prior illegal conduct is more likely to arouse the emotions of
the jury than to persuade its good judgment 00 the Government's judgment
should not be admitted only to prove proclivity. MXfost courts, however, would
accept evidence of past offenses as bearing on intent, where that factor is an
element of the offense alleged.51 In deciding whether prior government judg-
ments are relevant to establish an intent to participate in a subsequent conspira-
torial refusal to deal, then, a court would first have to determine whether in-
tent is an element of the refusal to deal violation.5 2 If it is not, any evidence
offered to prove intent would be immaterial. 3 If it is, the court would have to
be careful not to admit proclivity evidence wearing the guise of intent evidence.
A rule of thumb may be suggested: as the earlier offense moves closer to the
alleged conspiratorial refusal to deal (in time, in quality, in participants), the
probability of the judgment being genuine intent evidence increases.
Plaintiff's claim of relevancy might also be sustainable if the prior judgment
were offered to show an earlier segment of a continuing conspiracy of which
the subsequent refusal to deal is allegedly a later manifestation. When a con-
tinuing conspiracy actually exists, such evidence logically relates to the issue in
controversy; its probative value would outweigh any danger of prejudice.5 Of
course, determination of admissibility cannot await a judicial finding of con-
tinuing conspiracy. Admissibility must, therefore, be decided on the basis of
plaintiff's allegations, a procedure which may be unfair to the defendant. If, by
the end of the trial, the court is not satisfied that the refusal to deal is a con-
tinuation of the earlier conspiracy, it could strike the judgment from the rec-
ord.55 But, even so, the jury may have been already prejudiced against defend-
49. See McCoaRmicK, EviDmcE 315-21 (1954) ; note 29 supra.
50. "The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not because our victim is guilty
this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught,
is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court.' 1 I Wbmonm,
Evaa § 57 (3d ed. 1940) (referring to criminal cases). See generally 1 id. §§ 55-56.
51. See, e.g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949); American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F2d 233, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519
(1943).
52. In general, proof of specific or subjective intent is an element of conspiracy to
monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act, except where the monopoly has been realized.
See A'fY GN. NAT'L Comma. ANnTusT REP. 61. But a conspiratorial refusal to deal
will perhaps be held unreasonable per se, whatever its purpose, under § 1 of the Sherman
Act. See id. at 133; Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959);
Kessler & Stern, Competition Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 Ymx UJ. 1, 94-96
(1.959). But see OPPENHEIm, FEmRAL ANTiTRuST LAws 661-62 & n.39 (1959).
53. See McCoaacx, EvmENcE 315-21 (1954).
54. Similar fact evidence has been admitted in criminal cases where a continuing con-
spiracy was involved. See Rubio v. United States, 22 F.2d 766, 768 (9th Cir. 1927), cert.
denied, 276 U.S. 619 (1928); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913); cf. Hillside
Amusement Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
55. Cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559 (1947).
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ant.56 Although similar dangers are inherent in all jury trials, acuteness of the
problem in section 5 litigation has prompted the suggestion that prior judg-
ments be evidence for the court only.5 7
Plaintiffs might be able to establish the existence of a continuing conspiracy,
and therefore, that the prior judgment makes the subsequent refusal to deal
prima facie conspiratorial, by invoking a common-law doctrine that a conspiracy
once proved is presumed to continueY8 The Supreme Court has adopted a
modified form of this rule for antitrust cases; Local 167, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States 59 held that abandonment of a conspiracy violative of the
Sherman Act will not be presumed in an injunctive suit commenced by the
Government after criminal conviction. But this doctrine has never been applied
where the original conspiracy had been enjoined; compliance with a legal man-
date is usually assumed.6 0 Since government litigation usually ends in an in-
junction 61 a presumption of continuation would be inapplicable in most sec-
tion 5 actions. 62
In sum, the difficulties of establishing relevancy, together with the possible
application of Evergreens, may prevent a private plaintiff who alleges subse-
quent conspiratorial acts from obtaining section 5 advantages from a govern-
ment judgment.63 But even in that event limited benefit might be derived from
56. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) ("[It is a] naive as-
sumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury.").
57. See Seeley, supra note 44, at 24.
58. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912) ; United States v. Cohen, 145
F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1937) ; Coates
v. United States, 59 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1932) ; United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272
(S.D.N.Y. 1957). Some courts have said that a conspiracy which does not come to an end
naturally with the passage of time is presumed to continue until some affirmative act of
termination is shown. See United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1942) ; United
States v. Beck, 1.18 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1941) ; United States v. Rollnick, 91 F.2d 911 (2d
Cir. 1937); Eaker v. United States, 76 F.2d 267 (10th Cir. 1935); Telman v. United
States, 67 F.2d 716 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 650 (1933) ; United States v. Welin-
berg, 129 F. Supp. 514 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 226 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 933 (1956).
59. 291 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1934).
60. See United States v. Hosteen Tse-Kesi, 191 F.2d 518, 520 (10th Cir. 1951) ; Athens
Roller Mills v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Timken Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 604 (1.951) ; Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 205 F.2d 231,
233 (7th Cir. 1953).
61. See ArT'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 350 (1955).
62. It would, for example, have been inapplicable on this ground in all of the cases
cited in note 24 supra.
63. If so, defendant can move to have references to a previous judgment stricken from
the complaint. On several occasions courts have granted a motion to strike a reference to
previous government litigation where relevancy was not established. See Revere Camera
Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 81 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ill. 1948); Mebco Realty Holding Co.
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 6 FED. RULES SERV. 12f.21, Case I (D.N.J. 1942). But
courts will not use the motion to strike to decide "doubtful questions of law." Wells v.
Place, 92 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ohio 1950). This reluctance might explain why one court
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the prior litigation; if the earlier conspiracy is relevant, the prior litigation
might ameliorate his problems of proof by uncovering sources of information."c
would not grant a motion to strike in the subsequent conspiracy conte-xt. Alamo Theatre
Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ill. 1956). A prior judgment, if improperly
admitted, would be a valid ground for reversal only if the admission were "inconsistent
with substantial justice." See Fmn. R. Crv. P. 61; Lovely v. United States, 169 F2d 386,
388 (4th Cir. 1948); Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence
in the Federal Courts, 3 Viu.. L. REv. 48, 54 (1957) ("Regardless of its immateriality and
minimal probative value, highly inflammatory evidence is frequently considered to have
influenced the determination.... Evidence of past misconduct is similarly treated and this
practice is not limited to criminal cases.").
64. See Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4
Awnr uST BULL. 5, 7 (1959) ; Loevinger, Handling a Plaintiff's Antitrust Damage Suit,
4 ANrMrUisT Bu. 29, 43-44 (1959).
